

argument by a number of concrete examples, and so to convince those on whom the plain, simple statement of fact which he began with would have little effect.

The last passage illustrates another characteristic of Macaulay. He is fond of contrasting what actually happened with what might have happened or might have been expected to happen. He moralises thus on the fall of Richard Cromwell and the restoration of Charles II :

Had the Protector and the Parliament been suffered to proceed undisturbed, there can be little doubt that an order of things similar to that which was afterwards established under the House of Hanover would have been established under the House of Cromwell. But . . .

Had a prince, with a title as good as that of Charles, commanded an army as good as that of Cromwell, there would have been little hope indeed for the liberties of England. But happily . . .*

This is a way of making history more real by showing that what actually occurred might have happened otherwise—that events were not absolutely fated to take the particular turn that they did take. It is an expedient for making his readers think which Seeley continually employed. He says :

Historians are sometimes ridiculed by indulging in conjectures about what would have followed in history if some one event had fallen out differently. ' So gloriously un-

practical! ' we exclaim. Now it is not for the
sake of
practice, but for the sake of theory, that such
conjectures
are hazarded, and I think historians should
deal in them
much more than they do. It is an illusion to
suppose that
great public events, because they are on a
grander scale,
have something more fatally necessary about
them than
ordinary private events ; and this illusion
enslaves the
judgment.

*I, 124, 136 (i, ii).